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China’s tax policy response to
the global financial crisis
Wei Cui

On 4 August 2008, two unusually trenchant pieces of commentary on China’s
tax policy appeared in Caijing magazine (Xu 2008, Liu 2008). Both took aim
at China’s production-type VAT (value added tax), which differed from the
international standard consumption-type VAT in that it did not allow the VAT
that producers paid on purchases of equipment and other fixed assets to be
credited against VAT due on output. This resulted in the nonconsumed
portion of GDP being subject to VAT,1 which distorted both production and
consumption decisions. The first piece was by Xu Shanda, a former deputy
minister of the State Administration of Taxation (SAT). Xu chastised the
government’s long-standing hesitation to reform VAT. According to him,
the conversion to a consumption-type VAT should have happened during the
deflationary aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, but the government
had been too worried that such conversion would result in reduced revenue.
What would have been wrong with a little bit of deficit to finance tax reform,
Xu asked, especially if the reform, by removing a tax on business investment,
would have had the effect of stimulating investment, which the government
was trying to do in 1998 anyway? After 2003, once inflation rather than
deflation became the primary concern, VAT reform was delayed for the
opposite reason: the government was afraid that it would stimulate the
economy too much, and, in any case, policymakers might have felt that reform
was unnecessary, despite the inefficiencies of the production-type VAT, given
how well the economy was going. The result, Xu pointed out, was that there
was no backing for tax reform during either boom times or downturns.
Fortunately, he claimed, the State Council might occasionally rise above such
a political quagmire, and, once a decision was made, VAT reform could be
implemented without a glitch.
The second essay, by Liu Shangxi from the Fiscal Science Research Institute
of the Ministry of Finance (MoF), began with the statement: “The most
important issue is not always the most urgent; the most urgent issue is not
always the most important. But VAT reform is both most important and most
urgent.” The reasons he gave for the importance of VAT reform were many
(e.g. VAT was too narrow in scope and left the service sector to the cascading
Business Tax), but the urgency he felt was clearly traceable to one item: the
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rapid growth in tax revenue China witnessed in 2007 and the first half of
2008.2 Liu’s argument appeared to be: finally, we can afford VAT reform.
The actual turns of events during the rest of 2008 simultaneously belied and
fulfilled Xu’s and Liu’s prophesies. As the spreading global recession slowed
China’s export growth in the latter half of 2008, year-on-year tax revenue
growth went into an even faster decline, and became negative in October,
November and December (Ministry of Finance 2008, 2009a). Before boomtime indifference to tax reform could be overcome, it seemed, fiscal conservatism
during downturns might rapidly return. This highly unusual circumstance,
however, also produced a response that was quite unusual in terms of the
ordinary politics of Chinese tax policy: in early November, in the same week
that the State Council announced the “4 trillion yuan” stimulus package, it also
announced the decision to complete the conversion of China’s VAT into the
consumption type, effective on 1 January 2009.3 A tax reform measure that had
been advocated for over ten years was finally brought into fruition by the global
financial crisis (GFC).
We will see below that VAT reform constituted the most important tax
policy action China took during 2008–9. Of course, if China had had a more
typical tax structure, this specific policy instrument, as well as certain others,
would not have been available. Conversely, because of the idiosyncrasies of
China’s current tax structure, some of the policy measures commonly deployed
in other countries also cannot be used. In comparing the tax policies adopted
by China and Europe since 2008, therefore, major differences in prior tax
structures must be taken into account. But there are also two other potential
determinants of China’s tax policy, both alluded to in Xu Shanda’s essay. One
is the Chinese government’s general propensity (or lack thereof) to use taxation
as an instrument of economic policy. The other is the fate of fundamental tax
reforms, in the absence of which tax policy options that have macroeconomic
significance are limited. This essay makes a preliminary attempt at analyzing
these two additional factors, after first chronicling the significant tax policy
measures that China has adopted since 2008 and comparing them with what
happened in Europe.

China’s tax policy responses to the consequences of the GFC
During 2007, before the GFC could have been widely anticipated, China
adopted several important tax reduction measures, foremost among which
was the passage of the Enterprise Income Tax Law (EIT Law). The new EIT
Law, which took effect at the beginning of 2008, accomplished the longoverdue, widely supported integration of the previously separate corporate
income tax regimes for domestically and foreign-invested enterprises, and
reduced the nominal income tax rate for domestically-owned enterprises
from 33 percent to 25 percent. The effective tax rate for these enterprises
was further lowered thanks to the removal of a host of unjustifiable limitations
on deductions of expenses.4 This reduction in corporate income tax is
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consistent with trends in EU countries, and indeed in OECD countries
in general (European Commission 2010a), and was part of the long-term
strategy of “structural tax reduction” (jiegouxing jianshui) pursued by the
Chinese government, aimed at broadening the tax base and lowering tax rates
at the same time.
A reduction of the personal income tax (PIT) rate on deposit interest from
20 percent to 5 percent, as well as a popular policy that raised the monthly
deduction amount under the PIT for wage income to 2,000 yuan a month,
also came to pass by the end of 2007. The former policy should have been
controversial, because the administrative cost of collecting PIT on interest
was very low, and it is widely believed that Chinese individual saving behavior
is relatively inelastic and would not be easily distorted by taxes. In other words,
the tax on deposit interest was economically efficient. It was believed by some
to be unfair, however, because the poorer segments of the population kept
more of their savings in the form of bank deposits, whereas richer people
invested in assets, the returns on which were not always subject to effective tax
collection. Even so, given that PIT collected on interest income represented a
healthy 16 percent of total PIT collection (and 1 percent of total tax revenue)
in 2007, it seems that one could have chosen to cut other taxes that were both
inefficient and regressive, such as production-type VAT. In 2007, however,
there was still not enough momentum for such additional reform.
The increase in wage deductions was also significant. The monthly deduction
for wages had been increased as recently as 2005. Two thousand yuan per
month was roughly the median income of the Chinese urban population in
2007; the deduction thus excluded altogether about half of that population
(plus basically the entire rural populace) from the PIT on wages. According to
the estimate of the MoF, after taking into account other deductions, even a
person earning 10,000 yuan of wages a month (i.e. someone well into the top
5 percent of income in the entire Chinese population) was only subject to
an average PIT rate of 8.3 percent (Ministry of Finance 2009b). Indeed,
PIT revenue as a proportion of total tax revenue went into steady decline
after 2007.5 The narrowness of the PIT tax base directly implies that, during
2008–9, PIT could not have been an area of meaningful policy action.
Tax policies specifically responding to the global economic recession did
not appear until summer 2008. In August, China began a series of increases
in the rates at which VAT borne by various categories of exported products is
refunded to exporters. Globally, countries with VATs generally tax the import
of goods and completely refund any VAT borne by exported goods. In a
relatively unique arrangement, China offers export refunds only selectively
and at quite a varied set of rates, thus essentially imposing a set of excise taxes
on exports.6 Increasing VAT refund rates amounts to reducing these excise
taxes. The size of these tax cuts in 2008–9 was significant: export refund grew
by 10.6 percent in 2009 over 2008 (Ministry of Finance 2010b) despite
a decline of 13.9 percent in the total value of exports, implying well over
100 billion yuan of foregone revenue. Like some of the other policy measures
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discussed next, the increase in export refunds is a tool that one would not
expect to find elsewhere in the world.
The reform of VAT announced in November 2008 involved not only
allowing taxpayers to claim input tax credit for fixed asset purchases, but also
reducing by half the tax rate applicable to small taxpayers, and increasing the
minimal thresholds under which businesses would be exempt from VAT (and
the Business Tax). Although there are no published official estimates, the
change for small taxpayers alone could have implied a tax cut of between
30 and 40 billion yuan in 2009.7 The next tax cut targeted at small businesses,
however, did not come until the end of 2009, and its magnitude was small: the
EIT rate applicable to small businesses would be reduced from 20 percent to
10 percent for taxpayers earning less than 30,000 yuan of taxable income in
2010. Since taxpayers operating at this scale are usually taxed on the basis of
deemed instead of actual profits, it was unclear how effective this item of
policy would turn out to be.
In any case, between 2008 and 2009, the Chinese press reports on tax cuts
focused instead on two other areas. One was reductions in transaction taxes,
especially ones directed at more speculative parts of the Chinese economy. For
example, the stamp duty on securities transactions was cut twice, likely in
order to signal the government’s willingness to support the stability of the
stock market, just as stamp duty increases had been used before to express
concern about over-speculation. (Stamp tax rates on securities transactions
were adjusted nine times between 1990 and 2010.) Similarly, changing Business
Tax (BT), Deed Tax, Land Appreciation Tax, and stamp duty policies for the
secondary housing market merely continued a history of cyclical adjustments.8
The preferential BT policy on residential property adopted in December 2008,
for example, was strict by historical standards, and in any case it was reversed
in 2009, after it had become clear that the GFC would not stop real estate
speculation in China. The one excise tax cut aimed at real consumption was a
vehicle purchase tax rate reduction (from 10 percent to 5 percent) for small
vehicle purchases in 2009 and 2010, which may have contributed to the healthy
revival of consumer automobile sales in the second half of 2009.
The other area of potential tax cuts subject to intense media focus was
possible PIT reductions. The already preferential 5 percent rate on interest
income from bank deposits was reduced to zero in October 2008, but the real
heat was on increasing the monthly deduction for wage income. Rumors of
increases circulated through different press outlets despite multiple debunkings.
There was little evidence that such a tax cut (with strongly regressive effects)
would stimulate domestic consumption, however, and, much to its credit, the
government did not budge.
In early 2009, the MoF estimated that tax reductions adopted since late
2008 would result in RMB 500 billion of lost revenue in 2009 (Ministry of
Finance 2009c). This amount would turn out to be roughly 8.5 percent of
actual revenue collected during the year. The conversion to consumption-type
VAT (within VAT’s current scope) alone was predicted to cost the government
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RMB 123 billion.9 Increases in export tax rebate, and the cuts in securities
stamp tax and transactional taxes applicable to real estate transfers, were also
included in the estimate. (It is unclear how revenue estimates for the reductions
of taxes on real estate and stock transfers were calculated, given that the total
value of such transactions can be quite volatile. Commercial real estate sales,
for example, fell by 15 percent in 2008 over 2007, only to grow by 75.5 percent
in 2009. It is also unclear whether the effect of the new EIT law, in its second
year of implementation, was also counted in this estimate, which would result
in overstating the impact of government actions taken in response to the
GFC.) In addition, over 100 items of miscellaneous government fees were also
canceled, with an expected cost of 36 billion yuan to the government in 2009.10
Like other countries, of course, the Chinese government also enacted
revenue raisers to counter the budgetary impact of tax cuts. The privilege of
group consolidation reporting (which allowed members of a corporate group
to use losses of one to offset profit of another), previously granted to 106
state-owned enterprises and estimated to cost the government 40 billion yuan
per year,11 was ended at the beginning of 2009 (Ministry of Finance and State
Administration of Taxation 2008). Stricter enforcement led EIT collection
from foreigners to grow rapidly (Securities Times 2009). But, as the economic
downturn threatened the tax revenues of both national and local governments,
something less benign began to emerge. Despite projected economic slowdown
and tax cuts, the government set a nationwide target for revenue growth of
8.2 percent over 2008.12 Throughout 2009, evidence emerged of local tax
bureaus attempting to meet this target through illegal means. The city of
Wuxi, Jiangsu, for example, issued a set of rules for the “pre-collection”
of income tax on dividends with respect to individual shareholders on
undistributed profits of companies (Wuxi Local Tax Bureau 2009). Hebei
Province required any recipient of a gift of stock from anyone other than a
family member to pay tax at the capital gains rate on the entire value of the
stock received (Hebei Local Tax Bureau 2009).
More importantly, after tax revenue experienced 6 percent negative growth
(year-on-year) during the first half of 2009, the SAT, under a mandate said to
come directly from the State Council, ordered a nationwide tax audit campaign
in order to enhance tax collection (Xi 2010). Audit departments of local tax
bureaus were given targets of additional revenue generation set at twice the
revenue collected from audits for 2008. The result was spectacular: revenue
collected as a result of special audits in 2009 was 119.2 billion yuan, which
exceeded the sum of audit-generated revenue from 2006 to 2008.13 This
dramatic increase in collection, however, must be understood in light of
the fact that Chinese local tax agencies’ capacity for carrying out effective
audits is quite limited. “Enhanced audits” often simply mean setting higher
expectations in negotiations for tax payment with all taxpayers, instead of any
targeted action against noncompliance by specific persons. The audit campaign
thus effectively amounted to an across-the-board tax increase, and was widely
perceived to run counter to the policy of tax reduction (Wang et al. 2009).
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Interestingly, news reports suggest that the last time such an audit mobilization
occurred was during 1998, after the Asian financial crisis (Xi 2010). According
to this report, audit teams nationwide were mobilized in the fourth quarter of
1998, and, disturbingly, increasing penalties over which tax officials had
discretion had also become a device for increasing revenue intake.
Table 6.1 lays out the chronology of significant tax policy measures during
2008–9, whereas Table 6.2 displays the actual revenue outcome for 2009. As a
result of both tax cuts and slower economic growth, 2009 tax revenue growth
over 2008 was only 5.7 percent (after discounting tax revenue increase
from the absorption of transportation and road fees into the Excise Tax
(xiaofeishui)),14 in sharp contrast to the high growth rates of the preceding five
years. (Tax revenue grew by 20.7 percent, 19.1 percent, 18.6 percent, 33.7
percent and 18.8 percent during 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008, respectively.)
The growth patterns of revenue from specific taxes are also interesting. As
might be expected, total VAT revenue (net of export refunds) experienced
significantly below-average growth. Rate cuts also resulted in a big drop
in stamp duty revenue, despite a doubling of trade volume on the stock
market. Some of the other transaction taxes nominally subject to rate cuts,
however, generated significantly above-average revenue growth: the real-estate

Table 6.1 Chronology of significant Chinese tax policy measures, 2008–9
April 2008
August 2008–
June 2009
September 2008
October 2008
October 2008
November 2008
November 2008
December 2008
December 2008
January 2009
April 2009
December 2009
December 2009

Security transfer stamp tax reduced from 0.3 percent to 0.1
percent
Rates of rebate of export VAT on selective products raised seven
times
Security transfer stamp tax halved by requiring only buyer to pay
Elimination of personal income tax on deposit interest
Exemption from stamp tax on individual sale or purchase of real
property; exemption from land appreciation tax of individual sale
of real property
Reduction of deed tax rate for certain purchases of first
apartments
Comprehensive VAT reform, effective 1 January 2009: input credit
allowed for purchase of fixed assets; lower rates for small
taxpayers
Easing of BT policy on individual sales of residential housing
(effective for one year, 2009)
Imposition of excise tax on finished oil, to replace six types of fees
(intended to be revenue-neutral)
Reduction of vehicle taxes on purchases of small vehicles
(effective for one year, subsequently extended to 2010); RMB 5
billion subsidy program for retirement of inefficient vehicles
Limited BT exemptions for exported services adopted
EIT rate reduction from 20 percent to 10 percent in 2010 for
enterprises with less than RMB 30,000 of annual taxable income
Return to tighter BT policy on sale of residential property
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Table 6.2 2009 tax revenue breakdown
Type of tax

Percent of total Growth rate over 2008
tax revenue
(percent)

Total tax revenue

100

Domestic VAT (net of export
refund)

20.15

Enterprise income tax
Business tax
VAT and excise on import
Domestic excise

19.38
15.15
12.99
8.00

Personal income tax
Deed tax
Tariff
Vehicle and vessels purchase tax
Urban land use tax
Real estate tax
Land appreciation tax
Tax on use of agricultural land
Stamp tax on securities
transactions
Resource tax
Other miscellaneous taxes

6.64
2.92
2.49
1.95
1.55
1.35
1.21
1.06
0.86

9.8 (5.7–6.7 after
discounting fee-totax conversion)
2.3 in gross revenue,
10.6 in refund, −1.14
net
3.2
18.2
4.6
85.3 (20.93 after discounting
fee-to-tax conversion)
6.1
32.7
−16.2
17.5
12.7
18.1
33.9
101.3
−47.9

0.57
3.74

12.1
−14.4

Source: Ministry of Finance 2009b

component of the Business Tax, the Deed Tax, and the Vehicle Purchase Tax.
Other real-estate-related taxes also witnessed significant revenue growth.
Given that the income taxes experienced below-average growth, the overall tax
mix shifted towards excise/transaction taxes and property taxes in 2009.

Comparison with EU countries
According to a recent report by the European Commission, “tax policies have
played an important role in countering the financial and economic crisis” in
EU member countries (European Commission 2010b: 7). A preliminary
comparison of activist tax policy responses to the financial crisis in Europe
and in China yields the following observations:
1.

China’s ratio of fiscal expenditure to GDP increased from 19.26 percent
in 2007 to 20.82 percent in 2008 and 22.63 percent in 2009, which was
smaller than, but comparable to, the 4 percentage point increase in
expenditure ratio in the EU as a whole from 2008 to 2010 (European
Commission 2010b: 16).15
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3.

4.

5.

6.
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China’s ratio of total tax and nontax revenue to GDP experienced slight
increases (19.95 percent, 20.40 percent, and 20.42 percent for 2007, 2008,
and 2009), in contrast to the slight fall in aggregate revenue ratios in
Europe (European Commission 2010b). In other words, tax cuts did not
reduce total revenue intake as a percentage of GDP in China.
Once the effect of the one-time conversion of six types of fees into taxes
is factored out, China’s ratio of total tax revenue to GDP did decline as a
result of tax cuts. The 500 billion yuan in projected tax cuts represented
1.49 percent of 2009 GDP, implying a much greater tax policy response
than the EU average. (The majority of the measures adopted in EU
countries have had an estimated budgetary impact of well below a half
point of GDP.) In both Europe and China, however, the absolute amount
of tax cuts paled against increased government spending (European
Commission 2010b: 30, 16). In China, the cost of tax cuts represented
only 40 percent of increased spending.
In EU countries, cuts dominated in corporate and personal income
taxation, while increases were clearly prevalent in excise duties and
VAT. In fact, “one of the effects of the crisis on tax systems seems to be
a reinforcement of the trend of the last few years towards higher
consumption taxes” (European Commission 2010b: 31).16 This is opposite
to the choice of policy instruments in China, where the dominant portion
of tax cuts comprised VAT reductions (including both increases in export
refund and the conversion to a VAT of the consumption type) and
reductions in excise taxes (e.g. for vehicle and housing purchases).
“[O]ne of the most common types of measure [in Europe] was the direct
support of household spending power by reductions in the PIT.”17
However, because of the structural limitations of the Chinese PIT, only a
reduction in the tax on bank deposit interest was adopted in China.
Assistance to low-income households otherwise took the form of cash or
in-kind subsidies instead of tax expenditures.18
Social security contributions (SSC) and similar taxes increased as a total
percentage of government revenue in Europe, as a result of both the
relative stability of wages and government measures to support wage
levels (European Commission 2010b: 18). In China, social security fees do
not count as tax revenue and, indeed, do not even appear in the general
budget. Nonetheless, social security fee collection did grow by 17 percent
in 2009 (Ministry of Finance 2010a), faster than tax revenue growth. This
may be considered a parallel development to the European shift towards
higher SSC proportion of revenue after the crisis.19

While observations 1–3 and 6 identify similarities between China’s tax policy
response to the GFC and those found in the EU, observations 4 and 5 point
to divergences that are symptomatic of larger background differences.20 In
exploring these differences, at least two broad questions may be raised. One is
whether the Chinese government could have done more by way of tax cuts, or
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at least could have eschewed the nationwide audit campaign in 2009 (and the
extraordinary revenue it generated), which in all likelihood did not permanently
improve compliance but only amounted to a one-time extraction from the
economy during a difficult time. This question is particularly pointed given
that the central government is believed to have been hoarding cash in the
treasury, and much of the central expenditure budget has been drawn down
very slowly in the last two years (Wang et al. 2009). Against this suggestion,
however, it may be pointed out that there are important political forces
in China that favor the use of expenditure policy over tax policy. Most
fundamentally, the control of expenditure may be a powerful way of building
factions and patronages within the state apparatus, whereas granting relief
to taxpayers may generate few political benefits within a nondemocratic
system. And, when mechanisms for transmitting budgetary revenue to actual
expenditures are inefficient, higher spending goals – such as were set during
2008–9, especially for local governments –may also imply greater incentives to
secure revenue.21
A second, related question is the following. The European Commission’s
report found that “tax reforms enacted [by EU member countries during
2008–9] have been broadly in line with recent trends in tax policy,” especially
in terms of reduction of taxes on labor (European Commission 2010b: 7). In
the Chinese context, while the conversion to consumption-type VAT clearly
moved the tax system in the right direction for the long term, many other
measures did not necessarily reflect views about permanent reform. For
example, the tax cuts on real estate, vehicle, and securities transactions either
have already been reversed or may be reversed in the future, and in July 2010
VAT export refunds were revoked for six categories of products (406 items)
(Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation 2010). Whether
the tax mix should be moving towards the current miscellany of excise taxes,
as it did in 2009, is also subject to debate. Finally, since, unlike Europe, the PIT
base is very narrow in China, the long-term trend should be a rise in the share
of PIT in total revenue. The below-average PIT growth in 2009, therefore,
ought not to be regarded as a part of long-term tax policy.

Options and prospects for future reform
Where, then, have the policy measures since 2008 positioned China in terms
of the trajectory for future tax reform?
As a result of the decision to pursue VAT reform at the end of 2008, further
changes to China’s indirect taxes have gained surprising momentum. The
integration of VAT and Business Tax (BT), in particular, is being discussed
much more frequently than could have been predicted two years ago.22 BT,
which generally applies to services and the transfer of real and intangible
properties, covers a tax base that is normally covered by VAT in other
countries, but is a cascading tax imposed at rates (typically 5 percent) lower
than regular VAT rates. Its eventual unification with VAT had been anticipated
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ever since the two taxes were given their current shape in 1993 (Xu 2008).
Integrating the two taxes will give VAT taxpayers the ability to credit taxes
paid on input purchases of services, intellectual property and other intangibles,
and real property against VAT on output, which should have a pervasive
disinflationary effect on both domestically consumed and exported goods.
Moreover, the elimination of cascading could remove many behavioral
distortions and result in large efficiency gains, while being revenue-neutral.
In short, from the perspective of tax design, VAT/BT integration is a very
attractive reform option.
However, unlike VAT, which is split 75/25 between central and local
governments, BT is almost 100 percent a local tax, is the largest source of tax
revenue for most local governments, and is administered by local tax bureau
systems that do not collect VAT. Anyone proposing to integrate the two taxes
in favor of a comprehensive VAT, therefore, must explain how to compensate
local governments for lost revenue and address the implications of the
elimination of a major part of tax bureaucracy. The proponent must also deal
with a host of technical problems, such as (i) designing rules for the real estate
and financial sectors, which, internationally, are regarded as raising special
problems for VAT design, but which currently together generate over 60
percent of BT revenue; and (2) reconciling the current costly system of VAT
administration with the prevalence of small businesses among BT taxpayers.
Like all fundamental tax reform proposals, therefore, VAT reform still
possesses something of the character of a political orphan. According to the
mentality Xu Shanda ascribes to policymakers, if China has gotten by with
the separation of VAT and BT for so long, does it have to be fixed today?
The imposition of a broad-based property tax on real estate ownership has
also been a purported but elusive goal for a number of years. In the last few
years, there has been heated discussion over whether a property tax will
dampen real estate speculation, without any convincing conclusion.23 Wellintentioned arguments in favor of the property tax as a welcome supplement
to local governments’ revenue sources have also been advanced, but it is clear
that the tax cannot in itself plug the vertical fiscal gap that characterizes
Chinese public finance.24 Finally, while the nature of the property tax as a
progressive tax should have been a strong argument in its favor, prevailing
opinion seems to be that only owners of a third apartment (or apartments
over 200 m2) should be subject to it. At least in the public limelight, there
are few advocates of the property tax giving convincing accounts of its true
nature and arguing against its distortion and compromise in the course of
policymaking.
Major tax reform proposals have a way of taking on a faceless character in
China: at best, they are associated with vague statements in certain official
documents (“the State Council’s 2009 Opinion on Deepening Economic
Reform,” the “2010 Legislative Agenda,” etc.) and with ministries, but never
with persons. Indeed, since the beginning of China’s economic reform,
virtually no tax bureaucrat has ever risen to political prominence, and no
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politicians have ever claimed tax reform among their credentials. There
are no counterparts to Nicolas Sarkozy, Gordon Brown, or Oskar Lafontaine
(or Brian Mulroney, John Howard, or Ronald Reagan). This highlights a
fundamental character of Chinese tax policy, namely that it seems remarkably
insulated from the political process. There appears to be a lack of connection
between the incentives of politicians and the wide array of tax reform options
actually open to the country, resulting in most of these reform options lying
dormant for long periods of time and perpetuating an inefficient tax system.
The quick succession of tax measures since 2007 suggests that this is clearly
an important area of policy to watch, but any logic that could assist prediction
has yet to emerge.
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Notes
1 Hence the label “production-type” (as opposed to “consumption-type”) VAT.
2 2007 saw tax revenue growth of 33.7 percent over the previous year (Ministry of
Finance 2008). The first half of 2008 saw tax revenue growth of 33.5 percent over
the same period in the previous year (Ministry of Finance 2009a).
3 However, the limited scope of VAT was unchanged; only upon further integration
of VAT and business tax would China’s VAT become the consumption-type VAT
adopted in most other countries. All following references to the 2009 conversion
to a consumption-type VAT should be understood in the light of this caveat.
4 The effective tax rate for foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) increased due to the
repealing/phasing out of previous tax preferences. In 2008, FIE EIT revenue grew
year-on-year by 39 percent, outpacing the growth rate for domestically owned
enterprises by 16.2 percent. FIE EIT revenue as a proportion of total EIT revenue
rose from 27.57 percent to 30.11 percent (Ministry of Finance 2008).
5 The percentages in 2007, 2008, 2009 and the first three quarters of 2010 were
7 percent, 6.87 percent, 6.64 percent, and 6.6 percent, respectively. See revenue
analyses available at http://szs.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/gongzuodongtai (accessed
8 March 2012).
6 Indeed, up until 2007, the government had been reducing export refunds for goods
that either consume a high amount of energy to produce, generate high pollution,
or use nonrenewable resources.
7 Author’s computation based on domestic VAT collected in 2009 and the proportion
of total VAT collected from small taxpayers as of 2007, as shown in National
Bureau of Statistics (2008).
8 For a detailed examination of the history of transactional taxes in the Chinese real
estate market, see Cui (2011a).
9 See Xiong (2009). Data from the first half of 2009 suggested that the amount of
input tax credits (equivalent to less revenue collected) resulting from VAT reform
would slightly exceed the projection (China Taxation News 2009).
10 See “Ministry of Finance Answers Questions Regarding the Announcement of
Suspension of 100 items of Administrative Fees,” http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/200811/19/content_1153530.htm (accessed 8 March 2012).
11 Ministry of Finance internal report on file with the author.
12 See Wang et al. (2009). See also Ministry of Finance (2009c) (total revenue growth
in 2009 projected to be 8 percent).
13 Annual revenue collected as a result of tax audits hovered between 30 and 40
billion yuan between 2002 and 2007 (Xi 2010).
14 Computation based on Ministry of Finance (2009b). The fee-to-tax conversion
was expected to generate over 200 billion yuan of additional tax revenue, including
increased VAT collection resulting from the fact that the sales amount to which
VAT applies includes the excise tax.
15 The Chinese figures in this and the next two points are computed based on
budgetary reports similar to Ministry of Finance (2009c).
16 One prominent exception was the temporary VAT reduction to boost consumer
spending in the UK.
17 “This happened more often through increases in allowances than cuts in rates,
presumably also because an increase in allowances can be expected to more directly
boost private consumption given its proportionally higher impact on lower-income
households” (European Commission 2010b).
18 For example, government-set purchase prices for agricultural products were raised;
payments under the urban minimum income (dibao) program were increased; and
subsidies were given for sales of home appliances and vehicles in rural areas
(Ministry of Finance 2009c).
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19 In the first three quarters of 2010, the social security fee collection growth rate
(17.8 percent) again fell behind the growth rate of total tax revenue (24.2 percent).
See Ministry of Finance (2010c) and “Ministry of Human Resource and Social
Security: Five Social Security Funds Grew by 17.8%,” China News Net, 22 October
2010, available at http://finance.jrj.com.cn/2010/10/2210258391140.shtml (accessed
8 March 2012).
20 There are, of course, substantial variations among EU member countries in the
specific tax policies adopted in 2008–9 as well (European Commission 2010b:
19–20).
21 Given observation 3 above, however, whether such explanations that refer to
political factors unique to China are needed to explain the dominance of
expenditure over tax in the policy response to the GFC is open to debate.
22 For an overview of the VAT and BT components of China’s indirect tax system,
see Cui and Wu (2011).
23 The author is aware of no focused analysis of the expected incidence of the
property tax in China. According to the “capital tax” view of the property tax
developed by US economists, the property tax is a tax on all capital, and therefore
may not drive down the relative price of real estate (Zodrow 2007).
24 For excellent discussions of the vertical fiscal gap in China, see Hussain and Stern
(2008) and Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2008).

